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1. Introduction
The preliminary election for mayor of Boston in the fall of I'^ft?
presented an unusual opportunity for the studv of the voting patterns of
the Boston electorate. Because of the large number of candidates (five
ma^or, and ten in all) the electorate was fragmented into a number of
separate groups. In this paper, we use regression analysis to determine
if these different groups had recognizably different voting patterns in
other elections, or if support for candidates in the 1967 race was a matter
of personal anpeal rather than anpeal to definablv different voter groups.
In particular, we are interested in this regard in the voting
patterns of the supporters of John Sears (then a state representative).
To some local political analysts. Sears, except for the fact that he was
Republican, seemed to anneal to the same group of voters as did Boston
Redevelopment Administrator Edward T.ogue and possiblv Massachusetts
Secretary of State Kevin l-Zhite. On the other hand, considering the strong
showing that he made in the preliminary election, it seems possible that
Sears somehow succeeded in bringing out and activating a distinct group of
voters. It was thus of some interest to determine whether this group of
voters was in fact unique or whether it was a splinter group of the more
writing in the Boston Sunday Globe , August 6, 1967, Robert Healy
observed "... there is a Republican in Logue's future who is also worth
watching. His name is John Sears .... It is doubtful that a Republican
can win a preliminary election victory. But his kind of campaign can take
awav votes from Logue .... With the field this size and with an aggressive
campaign by Sears, Logue could be hurt."
-2-
progresslve voters of Boston.
In a somewhat similar vein, it seemed of Interest to examine the
voting patterns of supporters of School Committeewoman Louise Day Hicks
and of Citv Councilman Christopher A. lannella, the least liberal of the
five major candidates, to see in what respects thev were or were not
similar.
Finally, we were also able to examine the hypothesis that the
supporters of Mrs. Hicks formed a close-knit group coming out to vote for
her in any election in which she ran.
Some background on Boston politics and on the 1967 mayoralty election
in particular is clearly in order. Boston is a Democratic citv. No
Republican presidential candidate has carried the city since 192A. The
last Republican mayor was elected in 1925. The Republican voter registration
in November 1967 was 25,122 out of a total of 286,798 registered voters.
There are 202,351 registered Democrats. The concentration of Republicans
in a few of the city's wards is great enough to elect two Republican repre-
sentatives (John Sears was one of them) and one Senator out of a total city
delegation of 36 legislators and 7 Senators. Citv elections are nominally
nonpartisan. No party designation appears on the ballot.
In September 1967, as already indicated, ten candidates appeared on
the ballot in the preliminary election for mavor of Boston. The winners in
Robert Healv, Boston Globe , September 11, 1967, p. 11, "Her people
were with her last year and the year before that. It is a loyal and vocal
following . . . .'
David B. Wilson ( Boston Globe , September 21, 1967, p. 37) reported
that the proportion of voters choosing Mrs. Hicks in the preliminary election
would be about the same proportion which would choose her in the final
election and that, while this would win her a snot on the final ballot it
would not be sufficient to elect her mayor.
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this preliminary election were Mrs. Louise Day Hicks (43,722 votes) and
Kevin White (30,789). Third was John Sears (23,92A), fourth Edward Logue
(23,766), fifth Christopher A. lannella (18,3A3).~ .
Mrs. Hicks was a three term member of the Boston School Committee
and former chairman of that committee. She had been embroiled in a
continuing controversy with the Black community over de facto segregation
in the schools, and school busing nrograms. She was champion of the
neighborhood school and brought her audiences to their feet repeatedly during
her camoaign with the slogan "You knor* where I stand." The daughter of a
former municipal judge, she resides on a street named for her father.
Kevin IiThite was in his fourth term as Secretary of State of the
Commonwealth when he ran for mayor. He is the son, grandson, and son-in-law
of former presidents of the Boston City Council.
John Winthron Sears was a representative in the General Court for
wards 3 and 5 in Boston. He was a Rhodes scholar and an attorney and
financier.
Edward Logue was the only "outsider" in the preliminary election.
Reared in Philadelphia, educated at Yale, he had been brought to Boston by
Mayor John Collins as a result of his work in urban renewal in New Haven.
Shortly before the preliminary election Mayor Collins gave a modest
endorsement to Logue.
Christopher A. lannella had been a legislator for four terms and
was then a city councilman. He had been the ton vote getter for city
council in 1965.
t'Jhite won the final election in November by 102,706 to 90,154.
2
The sixth candidate received only about half of lannella's total
and candidates six through ten together received less than 15,000 votes.
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As Indicated above, and as explained in detail in the next section,
we used regression analysis to examine the behavior of supporters of these
five candidates in several other elections. The elections we chose for
study were:
1) The city council election of November 1967. This election was
of particular Interest because the eiphth of nine elected councllmen was
Thomas Atkins, a Negro Harvard Law School student. Moreover, number one
was John Saltonstall, Democratic nephew of the former Massachusetts Republican
Senator and from an old New Rngland family. Not since 19/tQ, when Boston
began electing councllmen at large, had anvone who was not of Italian or
Irish origin been elected to the city council. (In the 25 vears before 19A9
under the ward system of electing councllmen, 84 Irish, 12 Jews, 9 Yankees,
A Italians, and 1 Negro were elected.)
2) The school committee elections of 1963 and 1965 in which Mrs. Hicks
was the leading vote-getter. In 1963 Melvin King, a Negro, was an unsuccess-
ful candidate.
3) The gubernatorial elections of 196A and 1966 In which Republican
John Volpe defeated Democrats Joseph Belottl (1964) and Edward McCormack (1966)
Of Interest here was a test of ethnic voting nattems, in particular the
behavior of the Italian-American supporters of lannella when faced with both
a Republican and a Democratic candidate of Italian-American background.
4) The Senatorial election of 1966 in which Edward Brooke (a Negro
Republican) defeated Endicott Peabody (a Yankee Democrat).
5) The final election for mavor in November 1967 in which Kevin ^'/hite
defeated Mrs. Louise Dav Hicks.
Because attitudes toward Mrs. Hicks or, more generally, toward Negroes
were clearlv of imnortance in most of these elections as well as in the 1967
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prellminary election for mayor. It seemed likely that voting nattems among
Negroes would differ from those among l#iites. Accordingly, we removed all
precincts with substantial (more than 10 per cent, as determined bv the
1960 census) Negro population from our main study and considered them
separately.
Note that no similar reason prompts us to remove nrecincts with, sav,
a high number of voters of Italian origin. Indeed, if Italian-Americans
tend to vote for candidates of Italian origin this should show up in the
analysis of the behavior of lannella supporters.
?. The Method, the Variables, and the Model
In each election studied, we took as our dependent variable, the
fraction of those voting in a given precinct who voted for a particular
candidate. We sought to exnlaln that variable by regression on several
independent variables (the unit of observation alwavs being the precinct).
For the most part, such independent variables were the fractions of total
votes cast in the 1967 nreliminary election for mayor for the five maior
candidates so that the regression coefficients reflect the differing degrees
to which supnorters of the different 1967 mayoralty candidates also
supported the particular candidate whose vote is the dependent variable.
There was one other Independent variable used, however, and we shall discuss
this before returning to the general model and its intemretation.
In elections for citv council and for school committee, where more
than one candidate is to be elected, each voter can cast as many votes as
1960 was the most recent census year. It seems likely that precincts
which were more than 10 ner cent Negro in I960 had a rather higher Negro
proportion by 1967. The choice of 10 ner cent as the cut-off does not
materially affect the results.
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there are nositions to be filled (nine in the case of citv council and five
in the case of school committee). Not all voters fill out the ballot so
completely. Indeed, some voters, enterine; the booth primarily to vote ^or
candidates for a different office (mayor, governor, senator, or president,
for example) do not vote at all in such elections. Tliis raises a problem
as to hcrt^? this phenomenon which shows up in the data as blank ballots can
best be handled for our purposes.
The first possibility is simply to ignore the difficulty. One might
argue that a blank ballot might -just as well be treated as a vote for a
fictitious candidate. Yet this is clearly not very satisfactory. The
effect on the candidacv of a real person of numerous votes for such a
fictitious candidate is not the same as that of the same number of votes for
a real opponent. We do not want to count non-voting as though it were the
same as voting.
f)n the other hand, it is not possible to cut through the problem by
eliminating voters who failed to vote for the office in question or who failed
to vote as manv times as they legally could. (Indeed, it would be undesirable
to remove the latter group.) The only data available are the total number
of blank ballots cast in each precinct.
This is computed as follows. Let V be the number of voters entering
the voting booth. Let k be the number of different names for which a vote
can legally be cast in the given election. Let T be the number of votes
actually cast by all voters in the precinct. Then the number of blank ballots,
B, is given by the formula:
(2.1) B = kV - T.
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B thus measures the extent to which the actual number of votes cast falls
short of the lepal maximum. It Is reported for each nreclnct (or if not,
can be computed usln^ (2.1)).
From B, we can compute the average number of blank ballots cast per
voter, D = B/V. It Is evident that a given nonzero value of D can come
from two quite different sources. First, some voters may not have voted
at all for the given office, while others filled out the ballot completely.
Second, evervone may have voted but not as many times as he might have done.
Thus, for example, a value of D of 1/?. can arise If half the voters fill
out the ballot completely and the others not at all or if all voters fill
out half the ballot.
This clearly makes it Impossible to eliminate voters not casting any
vote for the office in question. It also makes it hazardous to try to
handle the problem by changing the measurement of the dependent variable
from fraction of voters voting for a particular candidate to fraction of
nonblank votes cast for that candidate. Aside from other problems, this is
so because the fraction of nonblank votes that can be cast for a particular
candidate depends on whether the nonblank votes are cast by the same or
different voters. (Voters may vote five times for school committee, but
they cannot vote five times for one candidate.)
We have tried to take account of this problem by using D Itself as
an Independent variable in the regressions. Thus, our other coefficients
can be Interpreted as effects which hold with the average number of blank
ballots per voter held constant.
This may not be really annronrlate, since it can be argued that the
casting of blank ballots is itself a nhenomenon that we may wish to explain
in terms of voting nattems in the preliminary mayoralty election. We take
up this matter in the Anpendlx where it is shown that most of the results are
insensitive to this nroblem.
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Our model Is thus thp following one:
(2.2) Y, = a„ + a^H. + n„I. + a.W. + a, I,. + a^S. + a,0^
1 n XI z X ji Ai ^1 01
where the symbols are defined as follows:
a^, . . . , a, parameters to be estimated
i subscript indicating precinct
Y. fraction of voters entering polling booth
in precinct i who voted for a particular
candidate in the particular election studied
H, fraction of voters entering polling booth
in precinct i in 1967 preliminary mayoralty
election who voted for Louise Day Hicks
I. similar fraction voting for Christopher A. lannella
W similar fraction voting for Kevin '.iThite
L. similar fraction voting for Edward Logue
S. similar fraction voting for John Sears
D. average number of blank ballots per voter cast
in nrecinct i in election studied (only nonzero
in city council and school committee elections)
.
A few remarks about the model and its interpretation now seem in order.
First, we have chosen a linear form as a simnle approximation. It works
quite well, hut no more is claimed for it than that. Second, we have
normalized the variables in per voter terms so that large nrecincts do not
dominate the sample. Thus the coefficient of H
,
for example, should be
interpreted as the number of percentage points by which votes for the
candidate in the election studied rises, other things equal, when we move
between precincts in which the vote for Mrs. Hicks in the 1967 mayoralty
preliminary election differed by one percentage noint.
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This leads us naturally to a discussion of the constant term, a .
This is, taken literally, the value of the dependent variable (the fraction
of voters voting for the candidate studied) which would have occurred in a
precinct in which all the independent variables were zero. Of course, no
such nrecinct exists, so the constant term must be regarded only as an
approximate estimate of such an intercept. Remembering that it Is only an
approximation, it should be regarded as measuring the strength of the candidate
in the election studied among otherwise undifferentiated voters — that is,
among voters who did not vote for one of the five nrincipal candidates in
the 1967 nreliminary election for mayor (either because they did not vote in
that election or because they voted for a minor candidate). Similarly, the
coefficients of the various other variables (except D) should be regarded as
measuring the extent to which the given candidate ran better (worse) among
those supporting Hicks, lannella, Logue, '<^ite, or Sears, as the case may be,
than he did among voters othen<7ise not classified. Tlius a coefficient of
zero for H., for examnle, would not mean that supnorters of Mrs. Hicks failed
1
to vote for the candidate in question, but that they did so in no greater
numbers than did unclassified voters. A negative coefficient would mean thev
did so in smaller numbers and a nositive one that they did so in greater
numbers. This will be imnortant in internreting the results to which we now
turn.
3. The Basic Results
As alreadv remarked, we first removed from the samnle anv nrecinct
which a comparison of precinct mans with census tracts showed to have had
more than 10 ner cent Negro nonulation in 1960, since it seemed likelv that
Negro and White voting nattems would differ in ways not captured bv our
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variab]es. The 5A "Ne^ro" nrecincts were treated separately to see if this
was so; we shall return to this later. The remaining precinsts were 221
in number.
The first election which we shall consider is that for citv council
in November 1967. The two candidates in that election whom we sinpled out
for particular attention for reasons already e;iven were Thomas Atkins and
John Saltonstall.
We first present the results of estlmatinj^ equation (2.2) with
dependent variable. A., the fraction of voters in nrecinct i votint^ for
Atkins. Figures in parentheses are standard errors.
(3.1) 1967 City Council Election: Atkins
A = .102 - .273 H. - .2-% I. + .A55 W. 4- .422 L + .723 S + .244 n.
(.06A) (.073) ^ (.077) ^ (.106) ^ (.122) (.072) (.OP-2) "^
R" = .«33 N = 221
The fit is extremely good (particularly considering the large number of
observations) and the coefficients are highly significant. All coefficients
save the constant term and the coefficient of are significantly different
from zero at least at the one-tenth of one percent level and frequently well
bevond. The coefficient of D is significant at the one percent level but
not at the one-tenth of one percent level. The constant term is not
significantly different from zero.
More Important, the results make good sense. Other things equal.
Hicks and lannella voters voted against Atkins (in the sense that he ran
Data for all elections prior to 1967 were taken from the Annual
Penorts of the Boston Election Department. For 1967, we used the official
tally sheets on file at that department.
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worse among them than among undifferentiated voters). Considering Mrs. Hicks'
position as to Negroes and schools, this is what xve should exnect of her
supporters. Similarly, if we identify lannella voters as largely from the
Italian-American precincts where a school bussing controversy was goinn on
and where Mrs. Hicks was said to be cutting into the Italian-American vote,
it is not surprising to find them less in favor of a Negro for cltv council
than unclassified voters were.
Sunporters of l^ite, Logue, and Sears, however, in a pattern which
we shall encounter again, tended to vote for Atkins. V/hite sunnorters and
Logue supporters did so to about the same extent (.455 and .4??, respectively),
but Sears supporters did so by far more (.723). ^#1116 Logue voters and ^-Jhite
voters were located in different places (otherwise the regression would not
have given significant coefficients to both L and W separately) , they acted
•just about the same so far as voting for Atkins was concerned. Sears voters
behaved more like these two groups than like anv other, but clearlv formed
9
a group with definably different voting behavior."
Finally, the coefficient of the average blank ballot variable, D, is
interesting, narticularlv when compared with the coefficients found in the
results to be presented below. Other things equal, Atkins did better where
average blank ballots were high than he did where thev were low. This is
See the column by Robert Healv, Boston Globe , August 11, 1'567, p. 9.
On the other hand, the evidence in the Appendix sho^^/s that lannella voters
tended to cast blank ballots in this (and other) elections, so that part
(but not all) of the explanation of the negative coefficient of I may be
that many lannella voters did not vote at all for citv council whereas Atkins
tended to be strong among voters casting only nartiallv blank ballots as
discussed below. If this is true, then lannella voters, given their value of
D, voted less for Atkins than did voters in other classes. See the Annendix
for further discussion.
2
The difference is statis ticallv sisnificant at about the five percent
level
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attributable to two related causes (associated with the different reasons,
discussed above, whv average blank ballots can be high). In the first
place, Atkins was not the best-knor-zn candidate for citv council. Peonle
voting for someone else for citv council and starting to fill out the full
ballot might not automatically put his name down (we shall see the reverse
of this true when we come to better-known candidates) . Rather, we would
exnect him to have done well among neonle who came out to vote partlcularlv
for him. Indeed, it is possible that manv neonle "bullet voted" for Atkins
— that is, voted onlv for him, leaving the other eight olaces on the
ballot blank. Partlcularlv considering his race and the candidacy of
Mrs. Hicks, we should expect Atkins not to have benefitted from relatively
inattentive voting. Uather, we would expect him to have done well among
peonle voting specially for him for city council. This is home out both bv
the coefficient of D and bv the relatively low value of the constant term,
indicating low strength among unclassified voters.
A similar but not identical pattern emerges when we examine the
candidacy of John Saltonstall in the same election. Indicating the dependent
variable by SA, the results are:
(3.2) 1967 City Council: Saltonstall
SA. = .416 - .212 H + .236 I + .353 W + .579 L. + .768 S. - .532 n.
^ (.055) (.064) (.066) (.091) ^ (.106) ^ (.06'') ^ (.072) ^
r'' = .837 N = 221
Again the fit is extremely good. All coefficients are significant at
The average value of T> across the 221 nreclncts was .338 in this
election. On the average, one in every three voters cast one blank ballot
or one in everv six cast two blank ballots, and so forth.
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better than the one-tenth of one percent level. As in the Atkins regression,
the coefficient of S is narticularlv significant, heinp; more than ten times
its standard error.
The pattern of the coefficients is again revealinp, narticularlv when
contrasted with that found for Atkins. The five grouns of voters are strung
out in ascending order of favorableness toward Saltonstall as : Hicks,
lannella. White, T.ogue , and Sears. This is essentially the same pattern
as for Atkins but here Hicks and lannella supporters no longer behave the
same: further, 'v'hite and Logue supporters are no longer indistinguishable.
If we consider Saltonstall as a candidate of old Yankee origin with
establishment and intellectual support, these results are about what we
would expect.
Further, Saltonstall led the returns for citv council. He was clearlv
the best-known name on the ballot. According to the argument given above
when discussing the results for Atkins, we should expect him to have a
relatively high constant term and to do better where ballots are filled out
than where D is high. These expectations are obviously borne out by the
results.
We turn now to some partisan elections for state and natioanl office.
The first of these is the gubernatorial election of 1966 in which John A.
Volpe, the incumbent Republican governor defeated lildward J. McCormack.
VJith VO denoting the dependent variable, the results are as follows:
(3.3) Governor, 1966: Volpe vs. McCormack
VO = .606 - ,'i25 n. + .396 I - .539 W + .333 L + .347 S
(.066) (.078) ^ (.06A) (.111) (.130) (.074)
R^ = .746 N = 221
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A(»aln the fit is quite ^ood, although not as j»ooc! as before. All coefficients
are significant at better than the one-tenth of one percent level with the
exception of the coefficient of L which is significant at the two percent
level.
The results are what we would expect in a partisan election and (like
some of the other results to he presented) , thev serve chiefly to check on
our methods. Relative to unclassified voters, supporters of regular Irish-
American Democrats, Hicks and '•Jhite, both voted against the Republican
candidate and for his Democratic Irish-American opponent. Supporters of
Italian-American candidate lannella voted for Italian-American Volne.
Supporters of Republican Sears voted for the Republican candidate. So did
those of Logue who himself had strong support in the business community.
An interesting difference lending added confidence to our method
emerges when we analyze the 1964 gubernatorial election in which Volpe
defeated Francis X. Rellotti, the incumbent Democratic lieutenant governor
who had himself unset the incumbent governor, Endicott Peabodv, in the
Democratic primary. The results are:
(3.4) Governor, 1964: Volpe vs. Rellotti
Vn. = .573 - .409 n - .214 I - .621 W + .465 L + .332 S
^ (.069) (.082) (.067) (.116) (.136) (.077)
R- = .731 N = 221
The blank ballot variable does not enter in a gubernatorial or
senatorial election since we can take as the denominator of the dependent
variable the total votes cast for the office thus simply eliminating voters
not voting for that office. In fact, we also discarded the very small
number of votes for candidates not from the two major parties.
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The fit Is again good. All coefficients are significant at better
than the one-tenth of one percent level with the exception of that of I
which is significant at the one percent level but not quite at the one-tenth
of one percent level.
The pattern is obviously the same as for the 1966 election with one
notable exception — the lannella voters. This is exactlv what one should
expect remembering that the Democratic candidate in 1964 was of Italian
rather than Irish descent as in 1966. It confirms our belief that lannella
voters tended to be Italian in origin.
The last of the partisan elections which we studied was that ^or
Senator in 1966. In that election. Republican Edward Brooke, a Negro,
defeated former Democratic governor, Endicott Peabodv. Using the vote for
Brooke as the dependent variable, and denoting it bv B., the results are:
1
(3.5) Senator, 1966: Brooke vs. Peabodv
B = .370 - .375 H + .123 T - .031 W + .206 L + .736 S
(.050) (.059) ^ (.04R) (.0«A) (.098) ^ (.056)
r = .871 N = 221
The fit is the best so far obtained. The constant term, the coefficient
of S and the coefficient of H are all significant well bevond the one-tenth
of one percent level. The coefficient of I is significant at the two percent
level. Tlie coefficient of L is significant at the five percent level. The
coefficient of W is not significant.
In a wav , these results reveal a pattern intermediate between that
observed in the 196 7 citv council election (and continued in the school
committee results below) and that observed in the gubernatorial elections
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just discussed. The order observed in the case of Atkins and Saltonstall —
Hicks, lannella, \-7hite, LoRue, Sears — is nreserved save for the inversion
of IJhite and lannella. This is reasonable. Since Hicks sunporters can
be characterized as Democrats with some anti-Negro bias, both the fact that
Brooke was Renublican and the fact that he was a Ne{»ro should lead to a
negative coefficient here. Similarly, the earlier results suRp,est that
Logue and Sears voters are liberal (in civil right matters) Republicans.
Roth effects lead to a nositive coefficient here, and the larger coefficient
on S. than on T,. is consistent with the resiilts found for Atkins and
1 1
Saltonstall. 'Jhite voters, on the other hand, might be characterized from
our earlier results as liberal Democrats. The fact that Brooke was a Neero
and the fact that he was Republican should here have pulled in opposite
directions and, accordingly, we find a near zero coefficient and a position
lower than that of Logue and Sears voters but higher than that of Hicks
voters. The only surnrise might annear to be the position of lannella voters
who in the results above and below are closer to Hicks voters when a Negro
runs than is anv other groun. Their coefficient in these results may perhaps
be explained bv two facts. First, this was the election in which Volne
faced McCormack in the gubernatorial race (see Equation (3.3), above) and
there mav have been some carry-over. Second, Brooke's wife is white and
Italian bom. She campaigned for him in the Italian districts.
The last t^^o elections to be examined are those for school committee
Gloria Negri in the Boston Globe for November 1, 1966 (p. 1?) , reported
that Remigia Brooke campaigned even at grocers: 'She is a great favorite
in the North End, East Boston and other Italian communities and lately has
been tossing in a bit of campaigning while doing her grocery shopping in the
North End."
Similarly, Timothy Leland wrote on Sunday, November 6, 1966 (p. 16)"
"His wife, Remigia, took over for her husband on the campaiCTi trail where he
left off, touring the North End with all the verve and velocity of a seasoned
politician."
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In 1963 and 1965 when Mrs. Hicks was herself a candidate for school coimnittee.
Particularly in 1963 when she was the incumbent chairman, the school committee
election was highly publicised and turned largely on the issue of treatment
and sej;regation of Negro children in the schools.
We begin with the 1963 election and turn first to the candidacy of
Melvin King, a Negro who unsuccessfullv sought election to the school
committee. Denoting the dependent variable bv K , the restilts are:
(3.6) 1963, School Committee: King
K = - .120 - .072 H - .165 1 + .5A7 W. + .All L + .711 S. + . A30 n.
(.063) (.073) (.073) (.102) "^ (.121) (.069) ^ (.085) ^
R" = .734 N = 221
The fit is about the same as for the gubernatorial elections. The
coefficients of W , L , S , , and V> are significant at least at the one-tenth
of one percent level; the coefficient of 1 is significant at the five percent
level; the constant term and the coefficient of H are not significant.
These results are very interesting when compared to those for the 1967
citv council election. For VJhite, Logue, and Sears voters, the results are
as one would exnect. They all voted for King more than did unclassified
voters and more than did Hicks or lannella voters. Further, Sears voters
tended to do so more than did the other two groups. Moreover, the results
as to blank ballots are consonant with our previous discussion. King was
stronger, other things equal, where blank ballots where high than where thev
were low.
It is the remaining three coefficients which require discussion —
the constant term and the coefficients of H. and I.. Consistent with the
i 1
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results for Atkins In 1067 (Equation (3.1)), we find all three proups —
Hicks voters, Tannella voters, and unclassified voters — to he less favorable
to a Ne^ro candidate for citv office than the reinaininp three ^rouns . 'fhat
may annear surprislnj^ is the near zero coefficient of H . This does not
Indicate, however, that Hicks voters were more favorable to Kin? than to
Atkins. Rather it indicates that thev were more favorable relative to un-
classlfie d voters . The shift from the Atkins results to the King results
in this regard is consistent either with a movement of Hicks voters toward
favoring the Negro candidate or with a movement of unclassified voters away
from favoring him. Obviously, In view of the issues on which the 196T school
committee election was fought and in view of Mrs. Hicks' own position and
candidacv the second hypothesis is more reasonable. It is borne out bv the
negative (though insignificant) constant term in the King results as opposed
to the positive (though insignificant) constant term in the Atkins results.
To put the matter slightly differently. It looks as though Hicks
voters had the same attitude in 1063 toward the candidacv of King as did
unclassified voters (and roughlv, as did lannella voters). That attitude
was preserved bv Hicks voters relative to Atkins in 1067, but it was not
shared by unclassified voters to so great an extent. It is of Interest to
note in this regard that King lost and Atkins won.
This shift, or difference in attitudes is borne out in a slightlv
different wav when we examine the results for Mrs. Hicks' own candidacies
for school committee In 1963 and 1065 (she led the ticket on both occasions)
.
Denoting the dependent variable bv HI, the results for 1963 are:
As we have so far done, we shall use the term ''Hicks voters" to
refer to those votin"; for Mrs. Hicks in the 1067 nreliminary election for
mavor, not to those voting for her in the 1963 and 1965 school committee
elections.
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(3.7) 1963, School Committee: Tllcks
}\1 = 1.30? - .031 H - .387 I - .384 W - .45ft L - .746 S - .936 n
(.071) (.061) (.061) (.Oft6) ^ (.101) ^ (.058) (.071)
r'' = .837 N = 221
The fit Is verv pood. All coefficients are significant well bevond the one-
tenth of one nercent level with the exception of the coefficient of H which
is not si^ificant.
For 1965, the results are similar:
(3.8) 1965, School Committee: Hicks
HI = 1.202 + .099 H - .371 I - .670 W. - .658 L. - 1.114 S. - .393 D.
(.073) (.085) (.088) (.118) ^ (.140) ^ (.079) ^ (.106) ^
R' = .794 N = 221
The fit is slightlv poorer but still verv j;ood. A>»ain all coefficients are
significant v;ell bevond the one-tenth of one nercent level with the exception
of the coefficient of H which is not significant.
The pattern of these results is clear. In both elections, Mrs. Hicks
ran strongly among unclassified voters and equallv well (but not stronger)
among those who would later support her in the 1967 preliminary election.
She ran weaker than this among lannella. White, Logue, and Sears voters,
listed in order of decreasing Hicks strength. (^ote that this is the order
which we should clearly expect from the earlier results. In particular,
note the difference between Sears and Logue voters.) Mrs. Hicks ran worse
where blank ballots ner voter were high, other things equal, than where
they were low, the effect being particularly strong in 1963. This is what
we should expect from our earlier discussion of the blank ballots variable.
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since Mrs. Hicks was far and awav the best known and (especially in 19(S3)
the most controversial candidate. There is some evidence of polarisation
from 1963 to 19*^5 with the relative anti-Hicks behavior of VJhite, T.o(>ue,
and Sears voters becoming stronger.
The reallv interesting phenomenon, however, is the fact alreadv
mentioned that in both elections Mrs. Hicks failed to run better among 1967
Hicks voters than among unclassified voters (although, of course, she ran
very stronglv among either group). Consistent with our examination of the
King-Atkins contrast, this stiggests a shift in behavior of the unclassified
voters between 1963-65 and 1967. Such a shift need not have been temporal,
for different offices were involved. Indeed, it is entirely possible that
had Mrs. Hicks run for school committee in 1967, she would again have run
well among the unclassified voters. VJhatever the explanation, however, in
1963 and 1965, when running for school committee, Mrs. Hicks ran well among
unclassified voters and among Hicks voters. In the preliminary election for
mayor in 1967, bv definition, she ran extremelv well among Hicks voters and
extremely badly among unclassified voters.
Moreover, this phenomenon was not slmnlv restricted to the preliminary
election. The results for the final mavoraltv election of 1967 are in sharp
contrast to those for the school committee elections just given. Thev are:
(3.9) 1967, Mayor (Final Election): Hicks vs. VHiite
HI = .883 + .285 H. - .525 I - .943 W - .772 L - .735 S
(.051) (.060) ^ (.0A9) ^ (.085) (.099) ^ (.056)
R'' = .881 M = 221
The fit is excellent, as before. All coefficients are significant well bevond
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the one- tenth of one nercent level.
The results show clearlv that while Mrs. Hicks ran relatively well
among unclassified voters, she Hid not run as well amonj? them as she did
among those who supported her in the mayoralty primary. This is not
surprising, but it bears on the phenomenon we have been discussing. In the
1963 and 1965 school committee elections, Mrs. Hicks ran equally well among
the n-zo groups of voters. When running for mayor in 1967, she did not run
as well among both groups. Moreover, the results clearly show that this
was not simply a matter of losing votes in the preliminary election which
then returned to her in the final. '-Jhile Mrs. Hicks was stronger in the
final election among unclassified voters than among any group save those
voting for her in the preliminary election, she was significantly weaker
among unclassified voters than among those supporting her in the preliminary.
This is in sharp contrast to the results for the school committee elections.
It is thus quite clear that the hvpothesis that the same groun of
people always comes out to vote for Mrs. Micks is false, 'nnen running for
school committee she had broader-based support than when runnlnq for mavor.
I^Ihether the difference is due to the nature of the offices, the opposition,
the issues, or a temporal shift in attitudes, it is clear that it is there.
It is scarcely necessary to remind the reader that Mrs. Hicks lost the final
mayoralty election to Kevin IThite.
T^inallv, as do (3.6) and (3.7), (3.R) shows ^'rs. Hick.s running
stronger among lannella voters than among the other groups. However, as
opposed to the results for the school committee elections, there was almost
no difference in this regard among Logue and Sears voters in the 1^67 final
election for mayor, both groups going strongly for Kevin UTiite. (The larger
negative coefficient for Wiite voters needs no explanation, of course.) It
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is interesting to note that this eeneral nattem is iust what we should
exnect since our earlier results tenH to show the five candidates strunf? out
alons a line in the order Hicks, Tannella, l^^^ite, Lo^ue, Sears.
^t. Summary of Conclusions
It seems annropriate at this point to summarize what we have learned
from the results of the preceding section. In hroad outline, the main
conclusions drawn are these.
1. The preliminarv election for mavor in 1967 split the ^ioston
electorate into six groups of voters (Tlicks, lannella, VJhite, T.ORue, Sears,
and unclassified). That snllt was far from random. Rather, each of these
groups displayed consistent voting characteristics in the various elections
studied and knoxr;ing how a precinct was snllt in the 1967 nrelimlnarv election
for mavor goes a long wav toward exnlaining its vote in the other elections.
We exnlain from 73 to 87 ner cent of the variance of the various dependent
variahles
.
2. In terms of attitudes toward "^egro candidates in nonpartisan
elections and related issues, the classified groups consistently range in
the order Hicks, lannella, White, T.ogue, Sears listed in ascending order of
favorahleness toward Negroes. I'nclassified voters fall at the Hicks-Iannella
end of the range, but much more so in the school committee elections of 1963
and 1965 than in the 1967 elections.
3. In partisan elections. Hicks and I^fhite voters are Democrats and
Logue and Sears voters Republicans. The candidacy of Edward Rrooke shifted
\'/hite voters to tho Republican column to some extont.
'i. lannella voters are clearly largely Italian-Americans, as one
might expect.
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5. Sears voters are a clearly separate group. In some elections the
Logue voters are rather like them, but in others, Logue and VJhlte voters are
rather similar. Invariably, Sears voters lie at the opposite extreme from
Hicks voters and generally are distinguishable from Logue and ^«fhite voters.
6. In elections for school committee and citv council where voters
can cast more than one ballot, other things equal, blank ballots help Megro
candidates (Atkins, Kintr) and hurt prominent or controversial candidates
(Saltonstall and especially Mrs. Hicks). This is consistent with the view
that voters fillinti out a complete ballot naturallv tend to vote for the
most familiar name and that 'lepro candidates tend to benefit from bullet
2balloting.
7. T^en running for school committee in l'>63 and 196S, Mrs. HicVcs
was strongest and equally strong among two groups of voters. Only one of
these groups supported her in the 1967 preliminary mayoraltv election, and,
while both groups supported her in the final election, thev did not do so
to an enual extent as had been the case in her winning school committee races,
Sears voters clearly tend to be Republicans or at least to he
located where there are Republicans. We regressed the fraction of the Sears
vote in the 1967 preliminary election for mavor (S ) on the ratio of register-
ed Republicans to the total vote in that election. Denoting the latter
variable by R the results were:
(A.l) S = .037 + .719 R.
(.OOA) (.019) ^
r^ = .Syo N = 2?1
Both coefficients are significant far bevond the one-tenth of one percent
level
.
2
Our other results do not denend on our particular treatment of the
blank ballot problem. See the Appendix.
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5. Precincts with a Substantial Negro Population
Refore closing. It seems of Interest to Hlscuss the results obtained
v/hen the same analysis was performed on the 5A nrecincts in Boston not
Included in the 2?1 to which the reported repressions annlv. As indicated,
these were those nreclncts which had a Negro population of more than 10 percent
— generally considerably more — in 1960 (the most recent census year). Typi-
cally, we would expect them to have had a higher percentage of Negroes by the
time of the analyzed elections.
The results for these precincts are rather different from those already
discussed and, while the additional results do not seem worth reporting in
detail, the broad nature thereof does merit some comment.
In the first place, as opposed to the 221 precincts already studied,
the 1967 preliminary mayoralty election did not appear to divide the electorate
of the 54 precincts into clearly distinguishable groups with different voting
patterns. While there are some regressions in which that division seems to
matter, on the whole it does not do so systematically. Tor the most part,
indeed, voters supporting four of the five named candidates in ]967 were
indistinguishable in other elections from unclassified voters.
There is, however, one striking (and expected) exception to this.
Supporters of Mrs. ]!icks in the I'^'S? preliminary election obviously form a
proun whose behavior in other elections differed sharply from that of the
other voters in these precinsts. It is obviously reasonable to suppose that
this is largely because her candidacy did (as the others did not) tend to
separate the electorate in these nreclncts into Negro and white voters. In
other words, while there are some exceptions, it helps to explain behavior
in other elections in these nreclncts to know where Hicks voters were located.
It does not heln slp;niflcantlv to know how tho rest of the electorate split
in the mavoraltv nrlmarv.
It does helo, however, to know where hlank ballots were hi^h. Tvpi-
callv, blank ballots were higher on average in these 5A precincts than in
the remaining ??1. This was narticularlv so in those two of our three
relevant elections in which there was a Negro candidate running. Thus, for
the 1963 school committee election, hlank ballots averaged .A]fi ner voter
in the 5A orecincts and .274 nor voter in the remaining '•''1. In the 10(S5
school committee election, the corresponding figures were .?4'S and .?''6,
while in the T^fi? citv council election, thev were .AOR and .338. further,
in contrast to tlie 2?1 nreclncts in which Tnnnella voters tended to differ
from the rest in casting a greater number of blank ballots (see the Anpendix)
,
in these 54 precincts. Hicks voters were notablv different from the rest: thev
cast sitmificantly fewer blank ballots.
These results are consistent with our earlier discussion which argued
that Mrs. Hicks tended to run well in school committee elections wherever
blank ballots were few, other things equal. Thev suggest in addition that
blank ballots were used in these 54 nreclncts for bullet voting, esnecially
for Negro candidates. Indeed, it is a reasonable characterization of the
results for the 54 precincts to sav that the two items which tend to matter
in the regressions are the location of the Hicks voters and the extent of
blank balloting.
Among the non-Hicks voters in these nreclncts, then, our results
suggest that what mattered was whether thev voted purposeful Iv , so to speak.
It should be added, however, that the fact that H and T). tend to
be highly negatively correlated occasionally makes it difficult reliably to
distinguish the two effects.
-26-
Given that, the split of the electorate by the 1967 nrellminary election
mattered relatively little. The candidacies of the other four named candidates
In that election annarently did not anneal to definably different grouns
with different voting patterns in the wav which we found to be clearly the
case in the precincts without a stibstantlal Megro population. Indeed, thev
did not appeal to groups much different from unclassified voters. It would
be somewhat surprising if it were otherwise. Onlv Mrs. Hicks (and nerhaps
lannella) among the named candidates could be expected to have sharply
different appeal from the other candidates in these precincts and we have
already controlled for the principal difference between the voters here and
elsewhere in the cltv by separating them in our analysis. Once that has been
done, heterogeneity within these precincts excent along the indicated lines,
is not verv pronounced.
-27-
Appendtx: An Alternate Treatment of Blank Ballots
In Section 2, we considered the problem raised for analysis by the
fact that in some elections more than one vote can be cast bv each voter.
In the main text we handled this by entering average blank ballots per
voter (D, ) as a variable in the regression eauatlons. This had the merit
of holding constant blank balloting per voter in comparing other effects,
but it may not be a wholly satisfactory way of proceeding. This is so
because blank balloting is itself not Independent of the other effects which
we are investigating. Thus, if Sears voters, for example, tend to blank
ballot more than Hicks voters, we may want to leave the blank ballot
variable out and attribute its effects to the snlit between Hicks and Sears
voters. On the other hand, to leave out the blank ballot variable is to
attribute to a given fraction of the vote for a given candidate the same
importance whether or not the remaining fraction is blank or is cast for
his opponents.
Fortunately, the results are generally not sensitive to this choice,
although they are a little less shnrn when the blank ballot variable is left
out than when it is in. We now present the results omittin?? that variable.
(3.1') 196 7, Citv Council: Atkins
A = .U6 - .271 H - .U6 T + .510 W + .AIT 1.. + .7«? S
(.063) (.07S) (.061) (.106) (.12A) ^ (.070)
P" = .R26 N = 221
The fit is nearly as pood as in Kquatlon (3.1). All coefficients save the
constant term and the coefficient of I. are signt<^lcant beyond the one-tenth
of one percent level. The coefficient of I is significant at the two
percent level and the constant term is significant at the five percent but
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not ouite at the two nercent level.
(3.2') 1967, City Council: Saltonstall
SA = .320 - .216 H - .070 I + .234 W + .555 L + .640 S
(.060) (.071) (.058) ^ (.101 ^ (.118) ^ (.067)
R^ = .794 N = 221
Apain the fit does not deteriorate much. All coefficients save those of H
,
,
I , and W are significant well heyond the one-tenth of one nercent level.
The coefficient of H is significant at the one nercent level : that of W
is significant at almost the two nercent level; that of I. is not significant.
(3.6') 1963, School Committee: King
K = - .046 - .027 H + .050 I + .577 W + .348 J + .764 S
(.066) (.076) (.063) (.108) (.127) (.072)
R" = .702 N = 221
Again the fit is ahout the same as in (3.6). The coefficients of W and S,
are significant at the one-tenth of one percent level; that of L is
significant at the one nercent level. The remaining coefficients are not
significant showing again no substantiallv different behavior among Hicks,
lannella, and unclassified voters in this election.
(3.7') 1963, School Committee: Hicks
HI = 1.141 - .129 H - .856 I - .451 " - .322 L - .863 S
(.069) (.081) ^ (.066) ^ (.115) (.135) (.076)
R" = .706 N = 221
The fit here deteriorates more than in other cases, which matches the fact
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that blank ballots were found to r>lay a fairlv large role In Equation (3.7).
All coefficients save those of H. and L. are significant well beyond the
one-tenth of one percent level. The coefficient of L is significant at the
two percent level; that of H. is not significant.
(3.8*) 1965, School Committee: Hicks
HI = 1.142 + .035 H - .577 I - .676 W - .5R1 L - 1.0R5 S
(.073) (.086) (.070) (.122) (.143) ^ (.081) ^
R" = .780 N = 221
The fit is nearly as good as in Equation (3,8). All coefficients are
significant far bevond the one-tenth of one percent level with the excention
of the coefficient of H which is not significant.
The results are qualitatively similar to those in the text and our
principal conclusions are obviously unaffected bv them. The principal
differences come in the coefficients of I . This suggests (and is borne out
below) that lannella voters tend to cast blank ballots. It also points up
the danger in omitting blank ballots from the analysis. Thus, for example,
in comparing Equations (3.7) and (3.7'), it might be thought that the latter
equation shows lannella voters strongly opnosed to Mrs. Hicks while the
former shows them onlv mildlv opnosed. In a wav, this is true if "onposed"
means "not voting for." In fact, however, large numbers of the lannella
voters not voting for Mrs. Hicks in 1963 were not voting for anvone for
school committee. A high negative coefficient for I-j^ in that regression
does not moan the same thing as a high negative coefficient for some other
variable associated with voters who are voting against Mrs. Hicks when thev
do not vote for her. This is whv we chose to hold blank ballots ner voter
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constant in the text, but it is comforting to know that it makes verv little
difference to our conclusions.
For what it is worth, we nresent repressions of T) on the other
variables in an attempt to see exolicitlv what groups tend to cast blank
ballots. As there are several reasons for casting blank ballots (as discussed
in the text), it is hard to interpret the results as more than descriptive.
(A.l) 1967, Citv Council: Hlank Ballots
D. = .180 + ,007 H. + .575 I + .?.2ii W + .045 1, + .?A1 S.
^ (.05?) (.061) ^ (.050) ^ (.086) (.101) ^ (.057) ^
R' = .56R N = 221
The fit is not nearlv so good as in the other results presented. Only a bit
more than half the variance is explained. Thus a large part of the variation
in blank balloting in this election is not associated with the split in the
mavoraltv preliminary election. The constant term and the coefficients of
I. and S. are significant beyond the one-tenth of one percent level. The
i 1
coefficient of W is significant at the one percent level. The remaining
coefficients are not significant.
(A. 2) 196T, School Committee: Blank Ballots
D = .171 + .106 II + .501 I. + .071 W - .1A5 L + .1''5 S
(.04Q) (.058) (.0A7) ^ (.082) (.096) (.054)
R~ = .571 N = 221
Again onlv a bit more than half the variance is explained. The constant
term and the coefficient of I, are significant bevond the one-tenth of one
percent level; the coefficient of S is significant at the five percent
level; the remaining coefficients are not sienificant.
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(A.*^) 1965, Sc?iool Committee: Blank Ballots
D = .]5? + .16A H + .S27 I, + .015 W - .19« L - .075 S.
(.045) (.054) (.OAA> ^ (.076) (.0S9) (.050) ^
R = .7"'. A N = ?.21
This time about 70 percent of the variance is exnlained. The constant term
and the coefficient of I are sipiificant at or beyond the one-tenth of
one percent level; the coefficient of H is siRnlficant at the one percent
level; the coefficient of L. is significant at the five percent level; the
remaining coefficients are not significant.
The conclusion emerging from these three regressions is that which
we have already anticipated in comparing our other results with and without
the blank ballots variable. lannella voters consistently cast a high
number of blank ballots relative to other voters. Other groups may or mav
not cast blanks relative to each other — this appears to depend on the
group and on the election — but the relative differences in their behavior
in this regard are small compared to the tendency for lannella voters to
vote blank.
Before closing this appendix, we may briefly mention an alternative
method for handling the blank ballots problem which we did not adopt. This
would be to take as the dependent variable not the fraction of voters enter-
ing the voting booth who voted for the given candidate but rather the
fraction of the actual (non-blank) votes which that candidate received.
This method, however, has the defect of counting precincts with very few
voters casting non-blank ballots the same as precincts with almost all voters
doing so. It can thus weight far too heavily the actions of relatively few
people. Since we are interested primarily in the behavior of people voting
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or not votiny^ for a nartlcular candidate, we Ho not want to count heavily
the actions of a few voters lust because thev happen to live in a precinct
in which interest in a given election is low. In any case, we performed
all the relevant repressions with this change in the denendent variable,
and while it does not seem worth while taking the snace to renort the
results of so doing in detail, there are essentiallv no differences of any
substantive Importance between these latter results and those alreadv
discassed (although, of course, the precise numbers are different).
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